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1. Introduction 
We here address the question of how, for a theory of justice, a concern for the promotion of 
equality can be combined with a concern for making people as well off as possible. Leximin, 
which requires making the worst off position as well off as possible, is one way of combining a 
concern for making people’s lives go well with a special concern for those who are especially 
poorly off. Many egalitarians, however, reject its near-monomaniacal focus on the worst off 
position (to the exclusion of other poorly off persons). In this paper, we explore the possibility of 
combining a weak kind of egalitarianism with a weak kind of efficiency requirement in a way 
that avoids leximin’s obsession with the worst off position. For example, one may consider 
solving all cases where efficiency is not at issue by choosing the alternative that is most equal 
according to the Gini-coefficient or some other well-established inequality measure. All standard 
inequality measures sometimes judge an alternative as more equal than another alternative even 
though the latter maximizes the benefits of the worst off. Thus it may seem like a promising way 
of avoiding the leximin approach within an egalitarian framework. Surprisingly, given certain 
generally accepted assumptions, this turns out to be impossible. The only possible way of 
combining weak egalitarianism with weak efficiency requires, we shall show, the rejection of a 
widely accepted—but perhaps dubious—contraction consistency condition on justice or the 
acceptance of some version of the leximin principle. 
 
2. The General Framework 
To fully specify an egalitarian theory one must specify the type of benefits that it seeks to 
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equalize. Throughout, we leave open the relevant conception of benefit (resources, primary 
goods, brute luck well-being, etc.) References to a person being worse off than another should be 
understood in terms of the relevant benefits. 
 We shall assume, for the sake of argument, that benefits are fully measurable and 
interpersonally comparable. This may seem like a strong assumption, but in the present context it 
is a very weak assumption. The assumption that benefits are so measurable and comparable does 
not entail that such information is relevant for the moral assessment of options. The assumption 
is simply that such information is available. This ensures that no principle of justice is ruled out 
merely on the grounds that it presupposes that benefits are measurable or comparable in ways 
that they are not. One important qualification, however, is needed here: if benefits are not—as 
required by leximin—ordinally interpersonally comparable (i.e., if there are no facts about who 
is worse off than whom), then leximin is not possible. Because we are exploring the possibility 
of avoiding leximin (or something like it) where it is possible, the assumption that benefits are at 
least so measurable and comparable is essential to our results. 
We shall be concerned with the assessment of the justice of alternatives, where 
alternatives are possible objects of choice (e.g., actions or social policies). Alternatives may have 
all kinds of features: they generate a certain distribution of benefits, satisfy or violate various 
rights, involve various intentions, and so on. In what follows, we shall assume that the only 
relevant information for the assessment of justice is the benefit distribution that an alternative 
generates. More formally, we shall assume: 
 
Benefitism: Alternatives can be identified with (and thus their justice assessed solely on the 
basis of) their benefit distributions. 
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Benefitism is a generalization of welfarism. Although it does not assume that welfare is 
all that matters, it does assume that justice supervenes on individual benefits. If two alternatives 
generate the same distribution of benefits, then they have the same status with respect to justice. 
Benefitism is a very strong assumption. It rules out the relevance, for example, of 
respecting the wills of agents (e.g., as reflected in their consent). It holds that there is no 
difference with respect to justice between forcing a person to go jogging against her will and 
merely successfully encouraging her to do so, if the benefits to her and everyone else are the 
same. Although we would reject this condition for this reason, we shall here grant it, since it is 
not relevant for the issue at hand. The issue of whether something like leximin is the only 
plausible egalitarian theory of justice arises even if equality promotion is limited, for example, to 
those alternatives that respect the wills of agents (e.g., violate no rights). Granting Benefitism 
will simplify the presentation. The results could, however, be recast as applying where the only 
relevant differences between alternatives concern the distributions of benefit that they generate. 
Given Benefitism, we can identify an alternative with the benefit distribution that it 
generates, and in what follows we shall do so for simplicity. We shall further assume that the set 
of benefit distributions generated by the set of possible alternatives is rich in the following sense: 
 
Domain Richness:  For any logically possible benefit distribution there is an alternative that 
generates that distribution. 
 
 This condition rules out, for example, the possibility that, where there are just three 
people, the distribution <3,7,9> (3 to the first person, 7 to the second, 9 to the third) is not one of 
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the alternatives. All logically possible benefit distributions are among the alternatives. This is not 
to say that all are part of any given feasible set (the alternatives that are open to an agent on a 
given occasion). Of course, there are lots of logically possible benefit distributions that are not 
feasible on a given occasion. The claim here is about the range of benefit distributions that can 
be assessed by justice, equality, or other normatively relevant perspectives. The condition holds 
that such judgements can be made for all logically possible distributions. 
 We believe that this is a highly plausible condition. Benefit distributions here play the 
role of test cases for a theory of justice. All logically possible test cases—assuming, as we shall, 
a finite population—are admissible.  
 Justice can be understood in axiological terms—what is at least as just as what—or in 
deontic terms—what is just (permitted by justice) relative to a set of feasible alternatives. 
Deontic justice in this sense need not be grounded in deontological properties. It might be, for 
example, that an option is deontically just if and only if it maximizes total wellbeing. We shall 
start by considering axiological justice and then turn to deontic justice. 
Axiological justice is concerned with the justice relation of (one alternative) being-at-
least-as-just-as (another). Following the standard definitions, (1) an alternative is more just than 
another if and only if it is at least as just and the other is not at least as just as it; and (2) an 
alternative is equally as just as another if and only if it is at least as just and that other is also at 
least as just as it. 
    
3. Paretian Egalitarianism 
Our general question is: What kinds of egalitarianism are compatible with the view that 
increasing everyone’s benefits makes things more just? Pure egalitarianism holds that justice is 
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concerned only with the equality of the distribution of benefits. Justice is sometimes understood 
as the purely comparative concern for ensuring that people get what they are owed, and, so 
understood, pure egalitarianism applied to brute luck benefits (benefits that were not deliberately 
produced by anyone) is not an implausible view. From a purely comparative perspective, it is 
worse when some get more brute luck benefits than others. Here, however, we are concerned 
with justice understood as the concern for people getting what they are owed in a non-purely 
comparative manner, and part of what individuals are so owed, we shall assume, is that their 
benefits be as high as possible, given the benefits that others receive. As a theory of justice so 
understood, pure egalitarianism is implausible, because it holds, for example, that perfect 
equality (e.g., <5,5,5>) is more just than everyone having more benefits but with an unequal 
distribution (e.g., <6,9,12>). Pure egalitarianism fails, that is, to recognize that justice is 
concerned in part with increasing the benefits that individuals obtain. 
 This problem with pure egalitarianism has lead many egalitarians to embrace leximin, 
which holds that justice is increased if and only if (1) the benefits to the worst off position are 
increased, or, (2) in case of ties, the benefits to the second worse off position are increased, and 
so on. Leximin adequately recognizes that justice is concerned with increasing people’s benefits, 
but it suffers from a different problem. It gives absolute priority to the worst off position. It holds 
that justice can require giving a very small benefit to the worst off position rather than giving 
large benefits to many slightly better off people who would still have less than average benefits 
(e.g., that <2,2,2,2,400> is more just than <1,80,80,80,400>).  
 Leximin is but one of a class of principles that give strict priority to benefits to the worst 
off position. In what follows, we shall be concerned with weak maximin, which is the principle 
that an alternative is more just if it makes the worst off position better off. Weak maximin is 
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silent about cases where the worst off position is equally well off (e.g., <2,3,5> vs. <2,4,4>), and 
is compatible with various ways of handling such cases. In what follows we shall examine the 
possibility of avoiding the strict priority of benefits to the worst off required by weak maximin. 
 A different—and seemingly more promising—way of combining a concern for the worse 
off with a concern for increasing people’s benefits is (axiological) Paretian Egalitarianism, 
which is the conjunction of Strong Pareto and Weak Egalitarianism, as defined below.  
 
Strong Pareto: For any two alternatives x and y, if each person has at least as much benefits in x 
as in y, then (1) x is as least as just as y, and (2) if there is at least one person that has more 
benefits in x than in y, then x is more just than y. 
 
 This is a weak efficiency condition on the promotion of benefits (much weaker than the 
utilitarian sum-total conception of efficiency). It requires, for example, that <2,4,6> be judged 
more just than <1,4,6> and also more just than <2,3,6>. It is silent about whether <2,4,6> is more 
just than <99,1,6>. 
 For the next condition, we appeal to the equality of distributions (which we will discuss 
in detail in the next section). We shall appeal to a relation that ranks distributions in terms of 
how equal they are (e.g., that ranks <2,2,2> as more equal than <1,2,3>). Moreover, we need to 
introduce the following definition. Call a distribution anonymously Pareto incomparable to 
another just in case it, and each of its benefit permutations (i.e., the same distribution of benefits 
except perhaps with people occupying different positions in the distribution), is Pareto 
incomparable (i.e., better for some and worse for some others) to the other distribution. This is a 
strong kind of Pareto incomparability. For example, <1,3,6> is Pareto incomparable with <2,1,6> 
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but it is not anonymously Pareto incomparable, since <1,2,6> is a permutation of the latter and it 
is Pareto inferior to <1,3,6>. 
 Consider now the following condition: 
 
Weak Egalitarianism: For any two alternatives that are anonymously Pareto incomparable, (1) 
if their two benefit distributions are equally equal, then they are equally just, and (2) if the 
benefit distribution of one is more equal than that of the other, then the former is more just. 
 
 This is a very weak egalitarian condition. It does not require (as pure egalitarianism does) 
that equality be the only concern of justice. It only holds that equality is determinative of justice 
in the case where two alternatives are anonymously Pareto incomparable. It is a very weak 
egalitarian principle, because it is silent even in many cases of Pareto incomparability (viz., those 
that are not anonymously Pareto incomparable).  
Weak Egalitarianism could be rejected for several possible reasons. One is the denial that 
equality is ever relevant to justice. A second reason allows that equality is relevant but only as a 
pro tanto consideration that can be outweighed by other considerations (e.g., sufficient increases 
in total benefits). A third reason holds that equality is indeed determinative of justice under 
certain conditions, but these conditions are limited to cases where the total is the same. Equality, 
on this view, is simply a tie-breaker when the totals are the same. 
 We believe that equality is more central to justice than these objections allow. In any 
case, in this paper we want to explore whether weak maximin is forced on a certain kind of weak 
egalitarianism, and hence we shall accept this condition. The conjunction of Strong Pareto and 
Weak Egalitarianism defines Paretian Egalitarianism. There are different forms of Paretian 
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Egalitarianism, because the conjunction of these two conditions leaves open how distributions 
are ranked that are Pareto incomparable but not anonymously Pareto incomparable (e.g.,  
<8,10,12> vs. <9,8,12>). Different forms of Paretian Egalitarianism fill in these cases in different 
ways.  
 One version of Paretian Egalitarianism that we shall consider below is Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism, which is defined as the conjunction of Strong Pareto and the following stronger 
equality condition: 
 
Moderate Egalitarianism: For any two alternatives that are Pareto incomparable, (1) if their 
two benefit distributions are equally equal, then they are equally just, and (2) if the benefit 
distribution of one is more equal than that of the other, then the former is more just. 
 
 This is just like Weak Egalitarianism except that it makes equality determinative of 
justice whenever two alternatives are Pareto incomparable, and not merely when they are 
anonymously Pareto incomparable. For example, if <9,8,8> is more equal than <8,10,12>, then it 
says that it is also more just, whereas Weak Egalitarianism is silent (since they are not 
anonymously Pareto incomparable). Moderate egalitarianism gives equality the strongest role 
possible while respecting Strong Pareto. It entails Weak Egalitarianism, but not vice versa. 
Paretian Egalitarianism seems like a promising way of combining equality with the 
efficient promotion of benefits while avoiding weak maximin’s obsession with the worst off 
individual. Paretian Egalitarians, for example, may wish to hold that <2,10,100> is less equal 
than <1,100,100>—and hence less just (given that they are anonymously Pareto incomparable). 
We shall now see, however, that if certain seemingly intuitively plausible assumptions are 
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satisfied, then Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible, and Paretian Egalitarianism 
cannot disagree with weak maximin. It cannot, for example, hold that <2,10,100> is less just—or 
even less equal—than <1,100,100>. Thus, Paretian Egalitarianism appears not to be a real 
alternative to weak maximin.1 
 
4. The Equality Relation 
Paretian egalitarianism appeals to the equality relation of one distribution of benefits being at 
least as equal as that of another. Following the standard definitions, (1) an alternative is more 
equal than another if and only if it is at least as equal and the other is not at least as equal as it; 
and (2) an alternative is equally as equal as another if and only if it is at least as equal and that 
other is also at least as equal as it. We here identify some uncontroversial assumptions that we 
make about this relation.  
 Our framework assumption of Domain Richness is an assumption about the range of 
benefit distributions that can be assessed by justice, equality, or other normatively relevant 
perspectives, and thus applies for the equality relation. It thus entails that the domain of the 
equality relation is the set of all logically possible distributions of benefits. We do not assume 
that the equality relation is complete, nor, except for one result at the end, that it satisfies any 
consistency requirement (such as acyclicity).  
  We shall, however, make the following three assumptions about this relation, each of 
which is at least close to being a conceptual truth about equality. 
 Consider, first: 
 
Perfect Equality: A distribution in which everyone gets the same benefits is more equal than 
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one in which this is not so. 
 
 This is completely uncontroversial. It says, for example, that <3,3,3> is more equal than 
<2,3,4> and more equal than <5,6,6>. 
 
 A second condition is: 
 
Equality Strong Anonymity: For any two alternatives, x and y, if x is at least as equal as y, 
then, for any alternative, x*, for which the benefit distribution is a permutation of the benefit 
distribution of x (i.e., has the same pattern of benefits, but perhaps with individuals receiving 
different allocations), x* is at least as equal as y. 
 
 This is a limited anonymity requirement on equality. It requires that, if <2,5,13> is more 
equal than <2,9,12>, then so is <5,2,13>. Equality Strong Anonymity is highly plausible, since 
equality is based solely on the pattern of benefits and is not concerned with who gets what. 
 A third plausible condition is: 
 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality: If (1a) the benefits of all the best off individuals are 
reduced without making them cease to the best off, and/or (1b) the benefits of all the worst off 
individuals are increased without making them cease to be the worst off, and (2) no one else is 
affected, then the result is more equal than the original distribution.2 
 
 This condition is also extremely plausible. It holds, for example, that <2,2,5,6,8,8> is 
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more equal than each of <1,1,5,6,9,9>, <2,2,5,6,9,9>, and <1,1,5,6,8,8>. 
 We are almost ready to begin examining the possibility of Paretian Egalitarianism 
disagreeing with weak maximin. First, however, it will be useful to note that, where there are 
only two people, weak maximin and the equality relation are intimately related. 
  
Result 1: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the equality relation 
satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, and (3) 
there are only two people, then for any two anonymously Pareto incomparable 
alternatives, the alternative that makes the worst off position better off is more equal. 
 
 The proofs of this and all following results are given in the appendix. We shall simply 
illustrate the core nature of each result. Consider here the anonymously Pareto incomparable pair 
<4,2> and <1,5>. The result establishes the intuitively obvious judgement that the former is more 
equal. Strong Contracting Extremes Equality entails that <2,4> is more equal than <1,5>, and 
hence Equality Strong Anonymity entails that <4,2> also is. 
 In the two person case, then, equality always favors the worst off when alternatives are 
anonymously Pareto incomparable. This ensures that, in the two person case, Weak 
Egalitarianism never conflicts with weak maximin. If two alternatives are not anonymously 
Pareto incomparable, then Weak Egalitarianism is silent and no conflict is possible. If the two 
alternatives are anonymously Pareto comparable, then equality agrees with weak maximin. This 
need not be the case, however, when there are more than two persons. The conjunction of Strong 
Contracting Extremes and Equality Strong Anonymity are silent, for example, about whether 
<6,8,100> is more equal than <100,5,100>. Nonetheless, as we shall now show, if certain 
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additional assumptions are made, then Paretian Egalitarianism must hold that <6,8,100> is more 
just—and indeed, more equal—than <100,5,100>. More generally, even in the multi-person case, 
Paretian Egalitarianism, like weak maximin, must not judge an alternative as at least as just as 
another if it is worse for the worst off position. 
 
5. Axiological Justice 
Axiological justice is concerned with the justice relation, and hence we need to specify the 
structure of this relation. We shall assume that the justice relation satisfies the following 
consistency condition: 
 
Acyclicity: If, for alternatives x1,….xn, x1 is more just than x2, x2 is more just than x3, …. and xn-
1 is more just than xn, then xn is not more just than x1.   
 
Acyclicity is much weaker than the better known requirement of transitivity. It applies only to 
chains of where each alternative is more just than its successor (as opposed to being at least as 
just) and allows the possibilities of silence (no ranking) and of holding the first alternative be 
judged equally just as the last (whereas transitivity requires that it be judged more just). It is 
about as close to being uncontroversial as one can get when it comes to consistency requirements 
on the justice relation. 
 For some of the results, we will strengthen this condition slightly in two ways. One is to 
invoke: 
 
Consistency: If, for alternatives x1,….xn, x1 is at least as just as x2, x2 is at least as just as x3, …. 
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and xn-1 is at least as just as xn, then (1) xn is not more just than x1, and (2) if for some i 
inclusively between 1 and n-1, xi is more just than xi+1, then xn is not at least as just as x1.3 
 
This strengthens Acyclicity by covering chains where each alternative is at least as just (as 
opposed to more just) as its successor. If the pairs are equally just, then it concludes that the last 
alternative is not more just than the first (as opposed to the silence of Acyclicity). Moreover, if 
all the relations in this chain are the relations of being more just, then Consistency strengthens 
Acyclicity by requiring that the last alternative not be at least as just as the first (as opposed to 
Acyclicity’s requirement that it not be more just). Like Acyclicity, Consistency is accepted by 
almost everyone. 
 We will also consider the implications of the following strengthening of Acyclicity:  
 
Quasi-Transitivity: If, for alternatives x1, x2, and x3, x1 is more just than x2, x2 is more just than 
x3, then x1 is more just than x3.   
 
 This is strictly stronger than Acyclicity in that it requires that the first element be more 
just than the last (as opposed to Acyclicity’s requirement that the last is not more just than the 
first). Quasi-Transitivity is strictly weaker than transitivity, since (like Acyclicity) it says nothing 
about chains in which one or more alternatives is only ranked as at least as just as its successor 
(as opposed to more just). It is also weaker than Consistency in this respect. It is, however, 
stronger than Consistency in another respect: for chains of alternatives that are each more just 
than their successors, it requires that the first be more just than the last, whereas Consistency 
allows silence.  
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 Quasi-Transitivity is much more controversial than Consistency. Indeed, one of us would 
reject it on the ground that sometimes silence is appropriate concerning the ranking of the first 
and last alternatives. Fortunately, our core results do not depend on this assumption. We shall 
merely note how they can be strengthened if one assumes Quasi-Transitivity as opposed to 
Consistency. 
 It is important to note that we do not assume that the justice relation is complete (i.e., that 
for any two alternatives, at least one is at least as just as the other). Paretian Egalitarians, for 
example, may remain silent about the ranking of two alternatives which are Pareto incomparable 
(and hence not covered by Strong Pareto) but not anonymously so (and hence not covered by 
Weak Egalitarianism). Moreover, even in cases of anonymous Pareto incomparability, Weak 
Egalitarianism may be silent because the equality relation may be incomplete and be silent about 
which alternative is more equal. This possible incompleteness of the justice relation is 
unproblematic for our analysis. Our results only rely on statements about the justice relation and 
the equality relation in uncontroversial cases. 
 We are now ready to present our first result concerning Paretian Egalitarianism. 
Interestingly, given the weak and plausible conditions invoked, it turns out that Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible.4 
 
Result 2: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the justice relation 
satisfies Acyclicity, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity and 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. 
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 The force of this result (and the structure of the  proof) can be seen by considering 
<7,8,11>, <10,8,7>, and <7,8,9>. Note that Strong Contracting Extremes Equality and Equality 
Strong Anonymity jointly entail that <7,8,9> is more equal than <10,8,7>, which in turn is more 
equal than <7,8,11>. Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism makes the following judgements: (1) 
<7,8,11> is more just than <7,8,9> (by Strong Pareto), (2) <7,8,9> is more just than <10,8,7> 
(because the two are Pareto incomparable, <7,8,9> is more equal), and (3) <10,8,7> is more just 
than <7,8,11> (because the two are Pareto incomparable, <10,8,7> is more equal). These three 
judgements, however, violate Acyclicity, which, based on the first two judgements, requires that 
<10,8,7> not be judged more just than <7,8,11>. Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism violates 
Acyclicity, and thus is impossible if Acyclicity is required, as we believe it should be. 
 Assuming Acyclicity and the other conditions, Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is not, however, the only form of Paretian 
Egalitarianism. The following result, however, establishes that no form of Paretian 
Egalitarianism can significantly disagree with weak maximin. 
 
Result 3 : If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the justice relation 
satisfies Acyclicity, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then Paretian 
Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is not less just than another if it gives greater 
benefits to the worst off position. Moreover, (a) if the justice relation also satisfies 
Consistency, then Paretian Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is not equally or less 
just, if it gives greater benefits to the worst off position, and (b) if the justice relation also 
satisfies Quasi-Transitivity, then Paretian Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is 
more just than another if it gives greater benefits to the worst off position. 
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 To see the force of this result, consider <3,3,99>, <2,4,4>, and <3,3,3>. Paretian 
Egalitarianism makes the following judgements: (1) <3,3,99> is more just than <3,3,3> (by 
Strong Pareto), and (2) <3,3,3> is more just than <2,4,4> (because they are anonymously Pareto 
incomparable and Perfect Equality entails that <3,3,3> is more equal). Acyclicity then entails 
that <3,3,99> is not less just than <2,4,4>. Moreover, Consistency entails that it is not equally or 
less just, and Quasi-Transitivity entails that it is more just. Thus, given the above conditions, 
Paretian Egalitarianism cannot judge <2,4,4> to be more equal than <3,3,99> (since if it did, 
given that they are anonymously Pareto incomparable, <2,4,4> would be judged more just, and 
that contradicts the results just obtained). Equality, that is, cannot be measured in a way that 
significantly diverges from weak maximin. 
 Given that Acyclicity is uncontroversial, the result establishes that Paretian 
Egalitarianism cannot judge an alternative to be more just than another if it is worse for the worst 
off position. This allows, however, that it might judge such an alternative to be equally as just as 
the other. Given that Consistency is also uncontroversial, the results also rule out this possibility. 
Thus, Paretian Egalitarianism cannot contradict weak maximin. It may be silent in certain cases 
where one alternative is better for the worst off than another, but it cannot affirm that the second 
is equally, or more, just than the first. This is enough, it seems, to eliminate any hope of Paretian 
Egalitarianism being significantly distinct from weak maximin. The much more controversial 
Quasi-Transitivity is not needed to establish this conclusion—although, if granted, it 
significantly strengthens the conclusion by ruling out the possibility of silence and thus requiring 
that Paretian Egalitarianism judge more just an alternative that is better for the worst off position. 
 It is worth noting that, assuming Consistency, the above result establishes that the 
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measurement of equality—and not merely justice—must not contradict weak maximin where the 
alternatives are anonymously Pareto incomparable. This is because Paretian Egalitarianism 
ranks the justice of such distributions on the basis of their equality. The result does not require 
that equality agree with weak maximin in other cases. For example, it does not require that <2,9> 
is more equal than <8,1>, since the two options are not anonymously Pareto incomparable.  
 It is also worth noting that the conditions of the above result are compatible. It is 
possible, that is, to satisfy all of them. Leximin, for example, satisfies all of them. Indeed, this is 
true of all of the results of this paper, and thus we shall not bother to repeat the reminder that the 
conditions invoked are jointly compatible (and satisfied by leximin). 
 There is, however, a possibility that we have not yet explored. We have so far focused on 
the justice relation. We have, that is, focused on axiological justice (what is more just than what). 
A different approach is to formulate the conditions of justice in deontic terms, that is, in terms of 
what is just (i.e., permitted by justice) relative to set of feasible alternatives. This latter approach 
does not attempt to provide a global ranking of alternatives. Instead, it attempts simply to 
determine which of any given set of feasible alternatives are just. We shall now explore whether 
the above results remain valid in this context.5 
 
6. Deontic Justice 
To start, let us reformulate the above axiological conditions that were used to define Paretian 
Egalitarianism and the two specific versions. The following definitions will be used below. An 
alternative is Pareto optimal, relative to a given feasible set, if and only if no feasible alternative 
is Pareto superior (i.e., makes some better off and no one worse off). An alternative is 
anonymously Pareto optimal, relative to a given feasible set, if and only if it is feasible and 
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neither it, nor any of its permutations, is Pareto inferior to some feasible option. 
 Consider, then, the following conditions: 
 
Deontic Strong Pareto: For any two alternatives x and y, if each person has at least as much 
benefits in x as in y, then, whenever both are feasible: (1) x is just, if y is, and (2) if there is at 
least one person that has more benefits in x than in y, then y is not just.  
 
Deontic Weak Egalitarianism: If two alternatives x and y are anonymously Pareto 
incomparable, then, whenever both are feasible: (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and 
only if the other is, and (2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism: If two alternatives x and y are Pareto incomparable, then, 
whenever both are feasible: (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and only if the other is, and 
(2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
 Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism is the conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto and Deontic 
Weak Egalitarianism. The conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto and Deontic Moderate 
Egalitarianism defines Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism. We shall starting by showing 
that, as in the axiological case, this latter theory of justice is impossible if one also accepts the 
following condition: 
 
No Prohibition Dilemmas:  For any feasible set of alternatives, at least one feasible alternative 
is just. 
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 This condition is plausible from the perspective of practical justice, according to which 
justice is purely a matter of comparing favorably in the relevant respects with the feasible 
alternatives (e.g., being at least as good in the relevant respect as all (or 90%) of the feasible 
alternatives [which is always possible], as opposed to giving everyone an adequate level of 
benefits [which is not always possible]). Practical justice always satisfies No Prohibition 
Dilemmas. Of course, justice can be understood in a more ideal way that does not guarantee that 
at least one feasible alternative is just, but we here focus on practical justice.6 
 Before introducing our first deontic result, let us note that we are assuming (as is 
standard) that, with one qualification, any logically possible set of alternatives is a possible 
feasible set. The qualification is that we restrict feasible sets to those for which, for each 
individual, there is a maximum possible benefit. The qualification is needed because it is unclear 
what rationality and justice require when benefits can be increased without limit. Let us now 
note:  
 
Result 4: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity 
and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism is impossible. 
 
 The force of this result (and the structure of the  proof) can be seen by considering the 
feasible set {<11,9,8>, <10,9,8>, <9,10,8>}. Note that <10,9,8> is more equal than <11,9,8> by 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, and hence Equality Strong Anonymity entails that 
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<9,10,8> is also more equal. Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism thus makes the following 
judgements: (1) <11,9,8> is unjust (because it and <9,10,8> are Pareto incomparable and the 
latter is more equal), (2) <10,9,8> is unjust (by Deontic Strong Pareto), and (3) <9,10,8> is 
unjust because <10,9,8> is unjust and they are equally equal (by Deontic Moderate 
Egalitarianism). Thus, nothing is just, which violates No Prohibition Dilemmas. 
 Given the conditions of the result, Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. It is not, however, the only form of Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism. Indeed, there 
are versions of Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism that, for some feasible sets, disagree with weak 
maximin. But this is not a particularly interesting observation, because, as we shall now show, if 
a feasibility set is rich in a certain sense, then the possibility of disagreement disappears. 
Domain Richness guarantees that the set of all alternatives includes all logically possible 
distributions of benefits. This does not, however, guarantee that any particular feasibility set is 
rich in any interesting sense. We shall focus, therefore, on feasibility sets that are minimally rich 
in the sense that if alternative x is feasible and maximizes (relative to the feasibility set) the 
benefits to the worst off position, then so is an alternative that gives everyone those same 
benefits. Thus, the feasible set {<2,4,6> , <1,9,9>}, is not minimally rich because it does not 
contain <2,2,2>, whereas {<2,4,6> , <1,9,9>, <2,2,2>} is minimally rich.  
We have the following result for feasible sets that are minimally rich: 
 
Result 5: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies 
No Prohibition Dilemmas, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then, 
for any minimally rich set, Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism (a) judges just some 
alternative that maximizes the benefits of the worst off position and (b) judges unjust all 
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alternatives that do not maximize the benefits to the worst off position. 
 
 To see the force of this result, consider the minimally rich set {<2,4,6>, <3,3,6>, 
<3,3,3>}. Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism judges that (1) <2,4,6> is unjust (by Deontic Weak 
Egalitarianism, because it is less equal, by Perfect Equality, than the anonymously Pareto 
incomparable <3,3,3>), and (2) <3,3,3> is unjust (by Deontic Strong Pareto, because it is Pareto 
inferior to <3,3,6>). No Prohibition Dilemmas then entails that <3,3,6> is just. But <3,3,6> and 
<2,4,6> are anonymously Pareto incomparable, and thus it follows that Deontic Paretian 
Egalitarianism must judge <3,3,6> as more equal than <2,4,6> (since, if it did not, <2,4,6> 
would also be judged just, and that contradicts the first statement made in (1)). A suitable 
generalization of this shows that it is not possible for Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism to judge 
just some alternative that does not maximize the benefits to the worst off position, and has to 
judge just some alternative that does so if the set is minimally rich. 
 Thus, although Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism can disagree with weak maximin, it 
cannot do so for feasibility sets that are minimally rich. Given that minimal richness is a 
condition that is often satisfied in real life situations, this possibility of disagreement is not very 
significant. For most practical applications, Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism cannot contradict 
weak maximin. 
 It is worth emphasizing that this result does not depend on any assumption of Acyclicity 
or any similar deontic consistency condition. Below we shall establish some results that do so 
depend. 
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7. Deontic Justice Reconsidered 
The results of the previous section establish that merely moving to a deontic framework is not 
enough to avoid the core of the two axiological results. One might argue, however, that the 
above formulations of the deontic egalitarian conditions are excessively strong. To see this, 
consider: 
 
Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism: If, for a given feasible set, two alternatives x and y 
are anonymously Pareto optimal, then (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and only if the 
other is, and (2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism: If, for a given feasible set, two alternatives x 
and y are Pareto optimal, then (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and only if the other is, 
and (2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
 These conditions are like their unrestricted counterparts, except that they apply, for a 
given feasible set, only to Pareto optimal alternatives (and, in the case of Restricted Deontic 
Weak Egalitarianism, only to those that are anonymously Pareto optimal)—rather than to all 
feasible alternatives. Suppose, for example, that the feasibility set is {<2,5>, <5,3>, <4,3>}. 
Deontic Weak Egalitarianism says that <2,5> is not just because it is anonymously Pareto 
incomparable to, and (by Equality Strong Anonymity) less equal than, <4,3>. Restricted Deontic 
Weak Egalitarianism, however, does not say this. It applies only to anonymously Pareto optimal 
options. Given that <4,3> is not anonymously Pareto optimal, the fact that it is more equal than 
<2,5> is not deemed relevant. 
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 Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism is the conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto 
and Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, and Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism is the conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto and Restricted Deontic Moderate 
Egalitarianism.7 Unlike the axiological and the unrestricted deontic case, in this restricted deontic 
case, Paretian moderate egalitarianism is, it seems, possible, as long as we assume that the 
equality relation satisfies the following condition:  
 
Equality Acyclicity: If, for alternatives x1,….xn, x1 is more equal than x2, x2 is more equal than 
x3, …. and xn-1 is more equal than xn, then xn is not more equal than x1.   
 
We have been assuming that the justice relation is acyclic, but so far we have not needed 
to assume that the equality relation is. Without this assumption, every Pareto optimal alternative 
could be less equal than some other Pareto optimal alternative, and Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism would judge all feasible alternatives unjust, which would violate No 
Prohibition Dilemmas. The assumption of acyclicity, however, is entirely uncontroversial, and 
we are merely explicitly noting it. 
 Consider then: 
 
Result 6:  Given (1) Benefitism and Domain Richness and (2) that the equality relation 
satisfies Equality Acyclicity, Perfect Equality, Equality Strong Anonymity, Strong 
Contracting Extremes Equality, there are versions of Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism (and hence Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism in 
general) that satisfy No Prohibition Dilemmas and that, even for a minimally rich feasible 
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set, (a) judge a feasible alternative just even though it does not maximize the benefits to 
the worst off position, and (b) judge a feasible alternative unjust even though it does 
maximize the benefits to the worst off position. 
 
To see this, consider the following version: 
  
Full Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism: An alternative is just, relative to a 
feasible set, if and only if it is Pareto optimal and no Pareto optimal alternative is more equal.8 
 
 This theory judges all alternatives just except those that are not Pareto optimal and those 
that are less equal than some Pareto optimal alternative. Hence, it satisfies both Deontic Strong 
Pareto and Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism. Moreover, for any acyclic equality 
relation, it will also satisfy No Prohibition Dilemmas (since there will always be at least one 
Pareto optimal alternative that is not less equal than some other one). Hence, in order to see that 
this theory of justice constitutes a real alternative to weak maximin, we may simply consider an 
equality relation satisfying our minimal conditions that disagrees with weak maximin. By way of 
illustration, suppose that a distribution is more equal if the total shortfall from the mean is less. 
This equality relation is acyclic and satisfies our three conditions on equality (proof omitted). 
Now consider the feasible set {<2,2,2>, <2,3,52>, <1,40,46>}, which is minimally rich. 
Alternatives  <2,3,52> and <1,40,46> are the only two Pareto optimal alternatives, and <2,3,52> 
(mean of 19, total shortfall of 33) is less equal than <1,40,46> (mean of 29, total shortfall of 28). 
Hence, given this equality relation, Full Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism 
judges <1,40,46> as just (because it is a most equal Pareto optimal alternative), judges <2,3,52> 
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as unjust (because it is less equal than some other Pareto optimal alternative than), and judges 
<2,2,2> as unjust (because it is not Pareto optimal). Thus, Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism can judge unjust an alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off 
position, and it can judge just an alternative that does not maximize these benefits. Now consider 
the feasible set {<2,2,2>, <2,3,43>, <1,40,46>}, which is minimally rich. Alternatives  <2,3,43> 
and <1,40,46> are the only two Pareto optimal alternatives, and <2,3,43> (mean of 16, total 
shortfall of 27) is less equal than <1,40,46> (mean of 29, total shortfall of 28). Hence, given this 
equality relation, Full Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism judges <1,40,46> as 
just (because it is a most equal Pareto optimal alternative), judges <2,3,43> as unjust (because it 
is less equal than some other Pareto optimal alternative than), and judges <2,2,2> as unjust 
(because it is not Pareto optimal). Thus, Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism can 
judge unjust an alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off position, and it can judge 
just an alternative that does not maximize these benefits. 
 Finally, then, we have, it seems, the possibility of a form of Paretian egalitarianism that 
can disagree with weak maximin even in the case of minimal rich feasible sets. There may, 
however, be further plausible conditions that, if imposed, would rule out this apparent 
possibility. Before concluding, we shall consider one such candidate condition . 
As noted above, we have not assumed any consistency conditions that correspond to 
Acyclicity (or related conditions). In a deontic context, however, the following condition is 
widely accepted: 
 
Alpha (contraction consistency): If an alternative is judged just relative to a given feasible set, 
then it is also judged just from any subset containing it. 
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Alpha is concerned with the preservation of judgement of justness as a feasibility set is 
contracted while still containing the alternative originally judged just. It is violated, for example, 
if x is judged just relative to {x,y,z}, but not judged just relative to {x,y}. If it is a winner against 
x and y, why would not it also be a winner against y alone? 
 If we accept Alpha, the impossibility of Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism returns: 
 
Result 7: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas and Alpha, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong 
Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible.9 
 
 To see the force of this result, consider the feasible set consisting of <6,9,12>, <11,9, 6> 
and <100,9,6>. Note that <6,9,12> is more equal than <100,9,6> (by Strong Contracting 
Extremes Equality and Equality Strong Anonymity). Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism thus makes the following judgements: (1) <11,9,6> is not just (by Deontic Strong 
Pareto), (2) <100,9,6> is not just (by Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism, because it is 
less equal than the Pareto optimal <6,9,12>). No Prohibition Dilemmas then entails that <6,9,12> 
is just. We shall now show that this leads to a violation of Alpha by considering the feasible set 
{<6,9,12>, <11,9,6>}, a subset of the original set. Note that <6,9,12> is less equal than <11,9,6> 
(by Strong Contracting Extremes Equality and Equality Strong Anonymity). Restricted Deontic 
Moderate Egalitarianism here judges <6,9,12> as not just (by Restricted Deontic Moderate 
Egalitarianism). Thus, given that <6,9,12> was judged just from the first set, but not from this 
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proper subset, Alpha is violated. 
 If we impose Alpha, then Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. It is not, however, the only form of Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism and 
some of these other forms are possible. As in the previous cases we have considered, however, 
no form can disagree with weak maximin when applied to minimally rich sets. 
 
Result 8: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies 
No Prohibition Dilemmas and Alpha, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect 
Equality, then, for any feasible set, Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism must (a) 
judge just some alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off position, and (b), 
if the feasible set is minimally rich, judge unjust any alternative that does not maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position. 
 
 To see the force of this result, consider the minimally rich feasible set <2,4,6>, <3,3,3>, 
<3,3,6>. Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism judges <3,3,3> as unjust (by Deontic Strong 
Pareto). To see how it judges <2,4,6>, consider the following subset of the initial set, {<2,4,6>, 
<3,3,3>}. In this case, Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism judges <2,4,6> as unjust (by 
Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, because it is less equal than the anonymously Pareto 
optimal <3,3,3>). Alpha then entails that <2,4,6> is also unjust relative the expanded set. No 
Prohibition Dilemmas then entails that <3,3,6> is just relative to this expanded set. The proof 
generalizes this example to all minimally rich feasible sets. Notice moreover that, because 
<2,4,6> and <3,3,6> are each anonymously Pareto optimal, Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Egalitarianism must hold that <3,3,6> is more equal than <2,4,6>. More generally, a distribution 
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that is maximin better cannot be judged less equal by this theory. There is, that is, no possibility 
of measuring equality in a way that significantly diverges from weak maximin. 
 Do these results show that even Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism must agree 
with weak maximin? That, of course, depends on the plausibility of Alpha. One of us is firmly 
inclined to reject it. We shall end with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this 
condition. 
 If axiological justice is a complete ordering, and, for any given feasible set, the set of just 
alternatives is simply the set of best feasible alternatives, then Alpha will be satisfied. Alpha is 
clearly a desirable condition for justice in the sense that it would be nice if justice satisfied it. 
The question, however, is whether it is a mandatory condition—one that any minimally adequate 
conception of justice must satisfy. 
 Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism can violate Alpha because it 
requires that just options be no less good in some dimension (equality) than any alternative that 
is Pareto optimal. Removing an option can make an originally Pareto suboptimal option become 
Pareto optimal, and this option may be better (more equal) than some third option that was 
originally not less good than any Pareto optimal option. Thus, this third option may be just 
relative to the original set but not relative to the subset. Suppose for the sake of argument that 
<2,2,2> is more equal than <1,40,46>, and that the latter is more equal than <2,3,43>. In this 
case, Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism judges just <1,40,46> when the 
feasible alternatives are <2,2,2> and <2,3,43> (since it is Pareto optimal and more equal than 
<2,3,43> and <2,2,2> is not Pareto optimal), but it judges <1,40,46> unjust when the only 
feasible alternative is <2,2,2> (since the former is less equal and both are Pareto optimal). Why 
would this be incompatible with minimum adequacy in a theory of justice? It cannot be simply 
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because there are two distinct dimensions of value. Justice can surely be pluralistic. Nor can it be 
the lexical priority given to one dimension (Pareto optimality). Minimally adequate theories of 
justice can surely invoke lexical priority. Nor, it seems, can it be that the lexically prior 
dimension has the feature that removing an option can make admissible a previously 
inadmissible option in this dimension. Thus, it is unclear why Alpha would be a mandatory 
condition on justice. 
 Several authors have argued against Alpha (or its counterparts formulated in terms of 
rationality and the like rather than justice). Amartya Sen, for example, has argued against any 
kind a priori requirement of internal consistency, and against Alpha in particular, for rational 
individual choice or social choice. There is nothing irrational, he argues, about having the goal of 
choosing the second largest piece of cake (e.g., so as not to appear greedy). This violates Alpha, 
however, since the originally second largest piece will not be rationally chosen if the largest 
piece is removed as a possible choice. Likewise, Sen argues, there is nothing irrational about 
choosing to fast when one has the alternatives of a full meal and of a very limited meal, but not 
choosing to fast when one’s only alternative is the very limited meal. The symbolic significance 
of fasting is radically altered by the absence of the possibility of full meal.10  
 Moreover, there are many examples of conceptions of justice that violate Alpha, but are 
not wildly implausible. To start, suppose that an option is judged just, relative to a feasible set, if 
and only if it is in the top 10% of the feasible alternatives in terms of some complete order of the 
value of alternatives. This is a kind of satisficing theory. Consider an alternative that is barely in 
the top 10% and then remove many of the less valuable options. If enough are removed, the 
original alternative will cease to be in the top 10%, and thus cease to be just. This violation of 
Alpha does not, however, seem wildly implausible. It is not clearly inappropriate for justice to 
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take into account the values of other feasible alternatives and to judge just those that are near the 
top in relative terms. 
 Consider next the bargaining solution (and view of justice), advocated by David 
Gauthier.11  It requires that “relative benefit” be maximinned, where relative benefit for a given 
individual is the ratio of the benefit the individual receives to the maximum feasible benefit she 
could receive. Consider the feasible set {<3,1>, <2,4>, <10,0>}. The relative benefits of these 
three alternatives are respectively {< .33,.25>, <.2,1>, <1,0>}, and thus <3,1> alone is deemed 
just (since .25 is greater than .2 and 0). If <10,0> is removed, however, the relative benefits are 
respectively {<1,.25>, <.66,1>}, and thus <2,4> alone is judged just (since .66 is greater than 
.25). This violation of Alpha, however, does not seem wildly implausible. Moreover, it occurs 
even if the requirement to maximin relative benefits is replaced with the requirement to 
maximize the total relative benefits or the requirement to maximize some kind of prioritarian 
weighted total relative benefit. It is not clearly inappropriate to scale benefits relative to the most 
an individual could get in a situation. 
 Consider next the view of justice that requires leximaxing complaints (i.e., minimizing 
the maximum complaint, and in case of ties minimizing the second (third, etc.) maximum 
complaint), where a person’s complaint is the absolute shortfall from the greatest benefits she 
could have gotten in the given choice situations. (This is the analogue of maximin regret in 
individual choice under uncertainty.) Consider the feasible set {<4,6>, <5,4>, <10,0>}. The 
individual complaints for these three alternatives are respectively {<6,0>, <5,2>, <0,6>}, and so 
<5,4> alone is just (since 5 is less than 6). If <10,0> is removed, however, the individual 
complaints are respectively {<1,0>, <0,2>}, and so <4,6> alone is judged just. Again, this 
violation of Alpha does not seem wildly implausible. Moreover, as above, this violation occurs 
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even if the requirement to leximax complaints is replaced with the requirement to minimize the 
total complaints or the requirement to minimize some kind of prioritarian weighted total 
complaint. It is not clearly inappropriate to have justice depend on complaints in these ways. 
 Finally, consider a theory of justice that Isaac Levi views as not implausible.12 It holds 
that (1) the weights assigned to each person’s benefits are nonnegative and sum to one, (2) there 
may be more than one admissible way to weigh each person’s benefits (perfectly equal weighting 
may not be required), and (3) an option is just if and only if it leximins benefits relative to the 
feasible options that maximize average benefits according to at least one admissible weighting 
scheme. Consider the feasible set consisting of <9,1>, <1,9>, and <2,2>. Option <9,1> 
maximizes average benefits when at least 50% of the weight is given to the first person, and 
<1,9> does so when at least 50% is given to the second person. Option <2,2>, however, does not 
maximize average benefits on any admissible weighting scheme. Thus, <9,1> and <1,9> are each 
just relative to this set, since each leximins benefits relative to the options that maximize average 
benefits relative to at least one weighting scheme. Consider now the feasible set consisting of 
just <9,1> and <2,2>. Here again <9,1> maximizes average benefits relative to some weighting 
schemes. In this case, however, so does <2,2> (e.g., for any weighting scheme that gives the 
second person at least 7/8 of the weight). Only <2,2>, however, leximins relative to the options 
that maximize the average on some weighting. Hence, <9,1> is not just relative to this subset, 
and that violates Alpha. Allowing some such indeterminacy in weightings (e.g., to allow for up 
to some specified extra weight to given to the chooser) is not clearly implausible. Nor is Levi’s 
approach for dealing with such situations.13 
 In sum, if an alternative is just if and only if it is a best feasible alternative, where the 
goodness of alternatives is a complete ordering, then Alpha will be satisfied. Alpha need not be 
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satisfied, however, if deontic justice is not rationalizable in the sense of there being some 
(context-free) ranking relation R, over alternatives, such that an alternative is just if and only if it 
is an R-best feasible alternative. Although rationalizability is a nice property, there seems to be 
little reason to require it of all minimally adequate conceptions of justice. As we have illustrated 
above, deontic justice may rely on normative concepts that are not compatible with a context-
free rankling relation. 
 We therefore tentatively conclude that Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism is 
possible and can disagree with weak maximin. 
 
8. Conclusion 
To be plausible, egalitarian theories of justice cannot be pure egalitarian theories. Axiological 
versions (what is at least as just as what)  must hold that 1) Pareto improvements (making some 
individuals better off and no one worse off) make things more just and deontic versions (what is 
just relative to the set of feasible alternatives) must hold that no Pareto suboptimal alternative is 
just. Pareto efficiency, that is, is lexically prior to the demands of equality. Paretian 
egalitarianism is committed to this view, and we have explored some of the forms that it can 
take. 
 Given the various plausible conditions that we identified, we have established that 
axiological Paretian egalitarianism (1) is impossible—if it makes equality dominant in all cases 
of Pareto incomparability, and (2) cannot disagree with weak maximin, if it limits the role of 
equality to cases of anonymous Pareto incomparability. It cannot, for example, hold that 
<2,10,100> is less just than <1,100,100>. Indeed, given that these two alternatives are 
anonymously Pareto incomparable (and thus ranked on the basis of equality), it cannot hold the 
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former is less equal than the latter. This radically limits the admissible measures of equality 
available to Paretian Egalitarianism. Indeed, none of the standard measures of equality are 
available, since they all hold that at least sometimes a maximin worse distribution is more equal. 
(For example, above, the Gini coefficient of inequality is 0.58 for the first and 0.33 for the latter 
alternative.) Axiological Paretian egalitarianism thus seems quite unpromising as an alternative 
to leximin and other forms of weak maximin. 
 If we turn to deontic justice, roughly these results remain valid if the egalitarian 
conditions are taken to require that an alternative be judged unjust if some feasible alternative is 
more equal. If, however, the egalitarian requirements are restricted to require only that an 
alternative be judged unjust if some Pareto optimal alternative is more equal, then Paretian 
egalitarianism can disagree with weak maximin. This is the only promising form of Paretian 
egalitarianism. Even it, however, cannot disagree with weak maximin if Alpha (contraction 
consistency) is imposed. We have suggested that Alpha is not a mandatory condition for justice, 
but admittedly our discussion is not conclusive. The future of Paretian egalitarianism depends on 
this issue and thus further investigation is needed. 
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Appendix 
Note: We are assuming that the appendix will not be published, and are including it here just to 
be safe (since we would prefer that it be published). If it is included, then we need to modify the 
text immediately following Result 1 along with the accompanying footnote. 
 
Result 1: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the equality relation satisfies 
Equality Strong Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, and (3) there are only 
two people, then for any two anonymously Pareto incomparable alternatives, the alternative that 
makes the worst off position better off is more equal. 
 
Proof: Consider any two anonymously Pareto incomparable alternatives. Because there are only 
two persons and they are anonymously Pareto incomparable, if the worst off position in one 
alternative, x, receives more benefits then the worst off position in the other alternative, y, then 
the best off position in x receives fewer benefits than the best off position in y. If the worst off 
person is the same in both alternatives (e.g., x=<6,8> and y=<5,100>), then it follows directly 
from Strong Contracting Extremes Equality that x is more equal than y. If the worst off person is 
not the same in both alternatives (e.g., x=<6,8> and y=<100,5>), then by Domain Richness, we 
may consider a permutation of x, x* (x*= <8,6>), and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality will 
judge x* more equal than y. Hence, by Equal Strong Anonymity, x is more equal than y. 
 
Result 2: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the justice relation satisfies 
Acyclicity, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity and Strong 
Contracting Extremes Equality, then Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible. 
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Proof: By Domain Richness, we may consider two alternatives x and y such that (a) they are 
Pareto incomparable but not anonymously so, (b) the benefits are the same in every position 
except for the best off position, and (c) the benefits in the best off position are higher in x than y 
(e.g., x = <7,8,11> and y = <10,8,7>). (1) By Domain Richness, there is an alternative, y* 
(<7,8,10>) that is a permutation of y and such that Strong Contracting Extremes Equality entails 
that y* is more equal than x. Equality Strong Anonymity then entails that y is more equal than x. 
Hence, Weak Egalitarianism judges that y is more just than x (because they are Pareto 
incomparable and y is more equal). (2) A contradictory judgement, however, can be obtained as 
follows. By Domain Richness, there is an alternative z (e.g., <7,8,9>) such that (a) x is Pareto 
superior to z, (b) Strong Contracting Extremes Equality judges a permutation of z, z* (e.g., 
<9,8,7>), more equal than y, and (c) z and y are Pareto incomparable. Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism thus makes the following judgements: x is more just than z (by Strong Pareto), 
and z is more just than y (z is more equal than y by Equality Strong Anonymity, and thus more 
just than y by Weak Egalitarianism). By Acyclicity, we have that y is not more just than x, which 
contradicts the conclusion obtained in (1). 
 
Result 3 : If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the justice relation satisfies 
Acyclicity, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then Paretian Egalitarianism 
judges that a distribution is not less just than another if it gives greater benefits to the worst off 
position. Moreover, (a) if the justice relation also satisfies Consistency, then Paretian 
Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is not equally or less just, if it gives greater benefits to 
the worst off position, and (b) if the justice relation also satisfies Quasi-Transitivity, then 
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Paretian Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is more just than another if it gives greater 
benefits to the worst off position. 
 
Proof: Consider any x and y, where the worst off position in x gets more benefits than the worst 
off position in y. (1) If no one is worse off in x than in y, then it follows from Strong Pareto that 
x is more just than y, as required. (2) If someone is worse off in x than in y, then the two are 
Pareto incomparable, and we consider two cases: (a) If there is perfect equality in x, then it 
follows that x and y are anonymously Pareto incomparable (e.g., x = <3,3,3> and y = <2,4,10>), 
and that x is more equal. Weak Egalitarianism then entails that x is more just than y, as required. 
(b) If there is inequality in x (e.g., x = <3,3,5> and y = <2,4,10>, then by Domain Richness there 
exists an alternative, z (e.g., <3,3,3>) such that everyone in z gets the same as the worst off in x. 
By Strong Pareto, x is more just than z. In this case, z and y are anonymously Pareto 
incomparable and Perfect Equality entails that z is more equal than y. Weak Egalitarianism then 
judges z more just than y. We thus have that x (<3,3,5>) is more just than z (<3,3,3>), which is 
more just than y (<2,4,10>). Acyclicity then entails that x is not less just than y, Consistency 
entails that x is not equally or less just than y, and Quasi-Transitivity entails that x is more just 
than y, as required. 
 
Result 4: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity and 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. 
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Proof: We will illustrate the proof with a three person example: By Domain Richness, we may 
consider the following feasible set {<11,9,8>, <10,9,8>, <9,10,8>}. Here, <10,9,8> is more 
equal than <11,9,8> by Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, and hence Equality Strong 
Anonymity entails that <9,10,8> is also more equal. Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism 
thus makes the following judgements: (1) by Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, <11,9,8> is unjust 
because it and <9,10,8> are Pareto incomparable and the latter is more equal, (2) by Deontic 
Strong Pareto, <10,9,8> is unjust because it is not Pareto optimal, and (3) by Deontic Weak 
Egalitarianism, <9,10,8> is unjust because <10,9,8> is unjust and they are equally equal (by 
Equal Strong Anonymity). Thus, nothing is just, which violates No Prohibition Dilemmas. 
 
Result 5: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then, for any 
minimally rich set, Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism (a) judges just some alternative that 
maximizes the benefits of the worst off position and (b) judges unjust all alternatives that do not 
maximize the benefits to the worst off position. 
 
Proof: Consider any minimally rich feasible set, and let x be any feasible alternative that does not 
maximize the benefits to the worst off position and let y be any feasible alternative that does 
maximize the benefits to the worst off position. We will now show that Deontic Paretian 
Egalitarianism has to judge x as unjust in this situation and that it must judge just some 
alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off position. (1) If no else gets more benefits 
in x than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y = <3,4,6>), then Deontic Strong Pareto entails that x is 
unjust, as required. (2) If someone else gets more benefits in x than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y 
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= <3,3,6>), then it follows that there is inequality in x. In this case, given that the feasible set is 
minimally rich, there exists an alternative, z (e.g., <3,3,3>), such that everyone in z gets the same 
benefits as the worst off position in y. Given that (a) alternative z is anonymously Pareto 
incomparable with x (since the benefits of the worst off position are higher in z than x, and the 
benefits of the best off position are lower in z than in x), and (b) Perfect Equality entails that z is 
more equal than x, Deontic Weak Egalitarianism entails that x is not just relative to this feasible 
set, as required. Given that x was an arbitrary feasible alternative that does not maximize the 
benefits to the worst off position, it follows that no such alternative is just. (3) By No Prohibition 
Dilemma, it follows immediately that some feasible alternative that does maximize the benefits 
to the worst off position is just, as required.  
 
Result 6:  Given (1) Benefitism and Domain Richness and (2) that the equality relation satisfies 
Equality Acyclicity, Perfect Equality, Equality Strong Anonymity, Strong Contracting Extremes 
Equality, there are versions of Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism (and hence Deontic 
Paretian Egalitarianism in general) that satisfy No Prohibition Dilemmas and that, even for a 
minimally rich feasible set, (a) judge a feasible alternative just even though it does not maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position, and (b) judge a feasible alternative unjust even though it 
does maximize the benefits to the worst off position. 
 
Proof: Given in text. 
 
Result 7: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas and Alpha, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong 
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Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible. 
 
Proof: (1) By Domain Richness, we may consider the feasible set consisting of <6,9,12>, <11,9, 
6> and <100,9,6>. Here <6,9,12> and <100,9,6> are Pareto optimal, but <11,9,6> is not. (a) By 
Deontic Strong Pareto, <11,9,6> is not just. (b) By Equality Strong Anonymity and Strong 
Contracting Extremes Equality, <6,9,12> is more equal than <100,9,6>. Restricted Deontic 
Moderate Egalitarianism thus judges <100,9,6> not just. (c) By No Prohibition Dilemmas, 
<6,9,12> is thus just. (2) Consider now the feasible set consisting of just <6,9,12> and  <11,9,6>, 
a subset of the original set. (a) By Equality Strong Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes 
Equality, <6,9,12> is less equal than <11,9,6>. Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism, thus 
judges <6,9,12> not just. (3) Given that <6,9,12> was judged just from the first set (in 1c), but 
not from this proper subset, Alpha is violated. 
 
Result 8: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas and Alpha, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then, for 
any feasible set, Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism must (a) judge just some alternative 
that maximizes the benefits to the worst off position, and (b), if the feasible set is minimally rich, 
judge unjust any alternative that does not maximize the benefits to the worst off position,. 
 
Proof: Consider any feasible set for which some but not all alternatives maximize the benefits to 
the worst off position. Let y and x be arbitrary alternatives in this set that respectively maximize, 
and do not maximize, the benefits to the worst off position. We will first show that, if the 
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feasible set is minimally rich, Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism has to judge x as unjust 
and has to judge just some alternative that maximizes the benefits of the worst off position. 
Following that, we show that it must make the second judgement even if the feasible set is not 
minimally rich. (1) Suppose, then, that the feasible set is minimally rich. (a) If no else gets more 
benefits in x than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y = <3,4,6>), then Deontic Strong Pareto entails that 
x is unjust. Given that x was an arbitrary alternative that does not maximize the benefits to the 
worst off position, No Prohibition Dilemmas then implies that some alternative that does 
maximize the benefits to worst off position is just. (b) If someone else gets more benefits in x 
than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y = <3,3,6>), then it follows that there is inequality in x. In this 
case, given that the feasible set is minimally rich, there exists an alternative, z (e.g., <3,3,3>), 
such that everyone in z gets the same benefits as the worst off position in y. Consider now the 
feasible set obtained from the original by removing all the alternatives other than z that 
maximize the benefits to the worst off position. In this restricted set, z is anonymously Pareto 
optimal and, by Perfect Equality, more equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal 
alternative. Hence, by Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, x and all other alternatives 
except for z are unjust, and by No Prohibition Dilemmas z is just. By Alpha, x is also unjust in 
the original superset. Given that x was an arbitrary alternative that did not maximize the benefits 
to the worst off position, this shows that every alternative that fails to so maximize is unjust in 
the original set. No Prohibition Dilemmas then entails that some alternative that does maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position is just, as required. (2) Suppose now that the original set is 
not minimally rich. We may make this set minimally rich by adding an alternative that gives 
everyone the same benefits as the worst off position in an alternative that maximizes the benefits 
of the worst off. From (1), we know that for a minimally rich feasible set, there is an alternative, 
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y, that maximizes the benefits of the worst off position, and is judged just, relative to this 
extended set. By Deontic Strong Pareto, it follows that y cannot be the alternative added to the 
initial set. Hence, y is in the initial feasible set. By Alpha, it follows that y is also just in the 
initial not minimally rich set.  
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